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ABSTRACT This article enters the debate on media events by analysing Dutch television news reporting of the
death of controversial right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn. It aims to demonstrate how the coverage of the murder, in
particular the representation of emotions, was implicated in the construction of a national, multicultural consensus.
A nationwide bereaved community was created by focusing on expressions of mourning, and converting emotions
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Introduction
In recent years television viewers have been
witnesses to many previously ‘‘unimaginable’’
emotional events. In the Netherlands, approxi-
mately 20,000 outraged citizens gathered in
central Amsterdam in the beginning of Novem-
ber 2004 to pay homage to murdered filmmaker
and journalist Theo van Gogh by making seven
minutes of ‘‘ear-deafening noise’’, to support
freedom of speech.1 Just a few weeks before
some 40,000 weeping fans participated in the
memorial service for popular singer Andre´
Hazes at the Amsterdam Arena stadium, and
more than five million people, almost one-third
of the Dutch population, watched the event live
on television. Few people seemed surprised that
the expressions of grief sparked by his death
also featured as the main item on the television
news, even on public TV.
It is not breaking news that news journalism
is invaded by both individual and collective
displays of emotion (e.g. Aldridge, 2001; Kitch,
2000; Walter, 1991; Walter et al., 1995). Coverage
of any culturally proximate tragedy will now
include depictions of public mourning, ‘‘vox
pops’’ telling about ordinary people’s feelings,
and expert comments on how to deal with the
trauma. That the interest in public outpourings
of emotion and the formation of unprompted
feeling communities is not confined within the
national borders becomes clear, for instance, in a
Dutch newspaper story (de Volkskrant , 7 Sep-
tember 2004) about a mass demonstration in
Italy following the tragic school siege in Beslan,
Russia: ‘‘Already on Saturday a spontaneous
sms-chain reaction was set off throughout Italy
calling for people to put candles in their
windows.’’
As several scholars have noted, there seems to
be a remarkably uniform frame in covering
extraordinary tragic events. Typically they are
represented as integrative events, moments of
national consensus and unity born out of
mourning together (e.g. Cloud, 1998; Kitch,
2000, 2003; Linenthal, 2001; O¨rnebring, 2004;
Pantti, 2005; Walter et al., 1995). When a disaster,
such as a political murder, occurs such commu-
nion is achieved through news media, which
can create and convey a feeling of temporary
national consensus, ‘‘a nationwide bereaved
community’’ (see Linenthal, 2001, p. 111), in an
otherwise fragmented society. Media’s ritual
role of bringing people together is most often
studied in the context of media events. In their
influential study, Dayan and Katz (1992, pp.
1967) see media events, defined as dominating
televised occasions based on interruption and
withdrawal from routine broadcast schedules,
as affirmation of social bonds and as moments
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when the dominant societal values are most
actively maintained. Our work enters into this
debate on media events by asking how the
representation of public displays of emotion in
the news coverage of the assassination and
funeral of a Dutch right-wing populist politician
Pim Fortuyn was implicated in the mechanism
of constructing, to reformulate Benedict Ander-
son’s (1991) well-circulated concept, an imagined
feeling community that brings people temporarily
together in otherwise fragmented society.
In the theory of media events, extraordinary
events feature as a ground that allows the spirit
of communitas to overcome the divisions (see
Daniel and Katz, 1992). Extraordinary, dramatic
events offer a place where the media can
position itself as the protector of societal values
and cultural identities. The ideological nature of
media events has received some critical atten-
tion recently (e.g. Couldry, 2003; O¨rnebring,
2004). The media event brings to the surface
the values and assumptions that are most
central to a particular culture, but it may also
have the effect of silencing other values and
alternative perspectives. Echoing Couldry’s
(2003) view that media events are as much
constructions as expressions of togetherness
we argue that news reproduces emotional ex-
pression with ideological consequences. Even if
media events normally may be expected to
render support to society’s value system, that
is not always or automatically the case. The
outcome may be in opposition of it, even
intensify social conflict, or, as our study sug-
gests, remain unpredictable and uncertain. For-
tuyn’s case is fascinating because of his political
message that went against Dutch society’s
celebrated values of tolerance and openness. In
contrast to, for instance, murdered Swedish
politicians Olof Palme and Anna Lindh who
were constructed in the media as symbols of
Nordic identity and values (Pantti, 2005), it is
more difficult to imagine how the murder of a
controversial figure like Fortuyn could be used
to create consensus. Fortuyn’s death, like his
life, was potentially divisive, but in television
news coverage there was little room for the
voices of discontent and internal controversies.
We analysed the main television news broad-
casts of Dutch public broadcaster NOS and
commercial broadcaster (RTL4) on the days
following the murder of Fortuyn, from the day
of the murder (6 May 2002) until the day of the
funeral (10 May 2002). NOS Journaal (public)
and RTL Nieuws (commercial) are the main
evening news programmes on Dutch television.
The NOS Journaal averages the bigger audience
of the two. In the week of the murder the
audiences for both NOS and RTL4 news, but
especially NOS Journaal , were larger than usual.
SBS, the other main commercial broadcaster
next to RTL, has been searching for a competi-
tive evening news formula. Its evening news,
broadcast under different names since 1997
(Actienieuws , SBS6 Nieuws , Het Nieuws , and
Stem van Nederland ) and broadcast at different
times, reached only a minor fraction of the
television audience in 2002.2 On 6 and 7 May,
Fortuyn’s death was the only item in both NOS
and RTL4 news. The main evening news bulle-
tins of NOS at 8 o’clock and RTL4 at 7.30 on the
night of the murder were extended programmes
and part of continuous, largely live news broad-
casts. On some of the following days and again
on the day of the funeral the news bulletins
were extended beyond their normal 25 (NOS) or
20 minutes (RTL4) duration. The funeral service
and the funeral of Pim Fortuyn on 10 March
2002 were broadcast live both on NOS and
RTL4.
Extraordinary Death of Extraordinary
Politician
Fortuyn was shot on 6 May 2002 when he left a
public radio studio in a Hilversum media park,
where he had been interviewed. The murderer
who turned out to be a white environment and
animal rights activist was arrested only a little
later. Because of his controversial opinions Pim
Fortuyn was not one who would have solicited
massive mourning if he had died a natural
death. His assassination, however, was followed
by a vast demonstration of public grief, with
floral tributes, candles, notes, silent marches,
and mourners lining up to view his body lying
in state in a cathedral in Rotterdam.
Fortuyn had had an erratic political career; his
political sympathies had moved from the Maoist
left, via the Labour Party to the right-leaning
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Dutch Liberals. In 2001 a recently formed
combination of local and regional parties, called
Leefbaar Nederland (Liveable Netherlands) asked
him to head their list for the 2002 national
election. At first glance dandyish Fortuyn, with
his ostentatious display of his homosexuality,
might have seemed an unlikely choice to win an
election, but his provocative way of raising
issues that had been considered highly incorrect
in the official compromise-seeking political
climate of the Netherlands brought him a
considerable degree of public attention and
popularity. Television, normally focusing on
the main parties represented in parliament,
soon started to pay critical attention to him.
Leefbaar Nederland scored ever higher in the
polls, but when Fortuyn suggested in a news-
paper interview that the anti-discrimination first
article of the Dutch constitution could be abol-
ished, the leadership of the Leefbaar Nederland
party made him resign. After this he formed his
own group, the List Pim Fortuyn .
Although Fortuyn accused the newspaper
of having rigged the interview, his anti-immi-
gration and anti-Muslim rhetoric, and anti-
multi-ethnic society standpoints increased his
popularity but also the suspicion of his aims
among other party leaders and in the media.
Fortuyn claimed that the Netherlands was ‘‘full
up’’, and he wanted a stop to further immigra-
tion, particularly from the Muslim world. He
criticized Islamic culture as ‘‘backward culture’’
and condemned the failure of Muslims to
assimilate with Dutch culture. However, For-
tuyn cannot be characterized simply as another
far-right politician, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen in
France or Jo¨rg Haider in Austria. He combined,
for instance, an anti-immigration position with
liberal views on drugs and same-sex marriage,
and even propagated a general amnesty for the
thousands of illegal immigrants living in the
Netherlands. These views obviously did not
have an adverse effect on his popularity. On
the other hand, Fortuyn’s ideas about environ-
ment protection and animal rights (he was in
favour of mitigating restrictive regulation of the
fur industry), which may have provided the
motive for his murder, had received little media
attention and had hardly been discussed during
the election campaign.
The other party leaders, especially those of
the ruling social-democraticliberal coalition,
who he held responsible for the ‘‘ruinous state’’
of the country, had great difficulty in finding
answers to his provocations. He triumphed in
most television debates with leaders of other
political parties, such as one organized by
commercial broadcaster RTL in the setting of
an entertainment show, in which the established
politicians felt conspicuously ill at ease. On
public TV Fortuyn also won an easy victory
over other politicians, when they were out-
witted by him and proved to be bad losers on
municipal-election day 2002. Fortuyn’s list had
won an astonishing share of the vote during
these elections and had carried one major city,
Rotterdam, where the long-ruling Labour Party
was swept away. At that time the polls already
predicted that he would repeat this success at
the 15 May general elections and might collect
nearly 20 per cent of votes. Eventually, Pim
Fortuyn’s List ended up as the second largest
party in parliament, behind the Christian-
Democrats. Especially Labour and the Liberals,
the main parties in Wim Kok’s coalition govern-
ment, suffered dramatic losses.
Constructing Feeling Communities
On the night of the murder the emotional
atmosphere in the Netherlands was one of
high tension and anxiety. The political centre,
The Hague, became a scene of riots, as protes-
ters burned cars and smashed windows next to
the government they blamed for his murder.
However, the response cannot be fully under-
stood as spur-of-the-moment reaction to an
extraordinary event: it should be seen within
the context of a more lasting emotional climate
that is related to underlying social-political
structures and to the emotional relationships
between members of the society (see De Rivera,
1992). One could speak of a climate of dissatis-
faction (voiced by Fortuyn and heightened by
his murder, as recent ethnic tension in the
Netherlands suggests) occurring when the peo-
ple cannot foresee what will happen either
politically or economically in the near future,
and there is a distrust between different (ethnic)
groups. Only a few weeks before Fortuyn’s
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assassination, the Dutch government had felt
obliged to resign after the publication of a
highly critical report of its conduct during the
civil war in former Yugoslavia and the Srebre-
nica massacre. Thus the emotional reactions of
the Dutch public to the death of Fortuyn may be
related to a popular mistrust of authority and a
deeper sense of threat to both national and
personal security.
The death of Princess Diana can be seen as a
key example of how difficult it is to separate
what the public reaction really is from the public
reaction constructed by the media. There are
several studies (e.g. Kitzinger, 1998; Turnock,
2000; Walter, 1999) that demonstrate that despite
the media rhetoric of a people ‘‘united in grief’’,
there were also many people who were not
personally affected by the death of the princess.
These studies make obvious that the rhetoric of
the ‘‘whole nation is mourning’’ may stand in
sharp contrast with actual emotions and beha-
viour of the majority of the people. Less
observed but similarly important is the question
about what is the emotion or emotions ex-
pressed in these extraordinary events? In the
case of the death of public figures, or tragedies
like 9/11 and the Madrid train bombings, the
public expressions are usually classified under
the heading of grief. One reason for this could
be that grief is perceived as ‘‘safe’’, unifying
emotion, whereas the emotions of anger and
hate are aggressive and divisive. Deborah Lup-
ton (1998, p. 171; also Furedi, 2004; Mestrovich,
1997) argues, that while valuing the open
expression of emotions, contemporary Western
culture is also wary of uncontrolled emotions,
especially negative feelings, such as anger, hate
and rage, that are viewed as personally and
socially destructive.
Emotions, including outbursts of popular
dissatisfaction, have always been part of public
life. As many political scientists and sociologist
have recently rediscovered, emotions lie be-
neath political action and mobilization (e.g.
Berezin, 2002; Goodwin et al., 2001; Marcus,
2002). Collective emotional experiences can re-
inforce the social order and bind people into a
moral community, but they can also stimulate
social change and revolt (Shilling, 2002). Due to
this ‘‘power of feeling’’ ruling elites have never
been indifferent to the emotional life of the
public and governments have always taken
seriously the task of managing the public
mood (Furedi, 2004). On the other hand, as
Furedi (2004, p. 49) claims, one of the character-
istics of the Western ‘‘therapy culture’’ is that
emotions have been made safe, depoliticized.
Therefore, according to him, the public display
of emotions is less likely to be perceived as a
source of instability by the traditional elite.
Against this claim, the statement of Prime
Minister Wim Kok on the day of the murder
(NOS Journaal ; RTL Nieuws , 6 May) certainly
suggests that the Dutch government was not
unconcerned about the possibility that the
murder might create undesirable emotional
responses and turn emotional crowds into
mobs:
This is deeply tragic for his next of kin. Deeply
tragic for our country and our democracy . . . In The
Netherlands! In a tolerant country with respect
for each other’s opinions . . . These are my personal
feelings. I feel shattered. I felt an urgent need to
tell you this. Let’s in God’s name keep calm! At
a time when one is inclined to be quite furious,
quite angry. Calm is perhaps the best service
now that we can render, in dignity, to the rule of
law and democracy and to the memory of Pim
Fortuyn.
The media play an important role in mana-
ging emotions and repairing social life during
major tragedies. Media can, for instance, ac-
tively contribute to turning a climate of anxiety
and fear into one of restored morale and
unification. Kitch (2003) has described how the
American news-magazine coverage of the
events of September 11 constructed a progres-
sive narrative in which the negative feeling of
fear was transformed into the positive feelings
of courage and patriotic pride. In the case of
Fortuyn, the question was perhaps more one of
trying to convert the divisive and destructive
sentiments of anger and hate into a unifying and
more passive feeling of grief, thereby stripping
public emotion of its ‘‘revolutionary’’ potential.
According to Hans Laroes, the managing editor
of the public NOS Journaal , the design how to
manage the public mood and outbursts of
emotions came from above:
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The cabinet’s reaction was: we must make this a
national event, just to be able to keep it in hand
more or less. And to some extent this is also how
we felt . . . The funeral got the character of a
national event, while it was not, of course. For it
was the mourning of one group, of people who
were opposed to the other people who walked
along with them and who were opposed to us who
filmed it.3
That anxiety and controversy existed in the
Netherlands became obvious firstly through an
unexpected level of support for Fortuyn after his
murder. What public television news (NOS
Journaal , 9 May) was worried about happened
in the end: ‘‘people voted with their emotions’’.
Another blow, even if symbolic, to the Dutch
cultural and political elite was that anti-immi-
gration and anti-Islam Fortuyn was declared as
‘‘the greatest Dutchman of all times’’ in the
television contest of the same name (NOS, 16
November 2004), coming ahead of ‘‘respectable’’
figures like William of Orange, Rembrandt or
Vincent Van Gogh. In the wake of the killing of
Theo van Gogh political dissatisfaction reached
another, and without doubt more frightening
level, as the ethnic and religious conflicts
worsened to the point of open violence, such
as the burning of Islamic schools.
Certainly, there is nothing new about the
creation of community or consensus in broad-
casting. From the beginning broadcasting has
been organized within the territory of a state
with the explicit aim to serve the nation, and,
what is important in our discussion, also to help
construct a sense of national unity (Morley and
Robins, 1995, p. 10). Serving the whole nation,
implied an educative and civilizing mission, one
of making the people aware of national identity,
of belonging together, of sharing a language and
a culture, of community (Cardiff and Scannell,
1987; Harrison, 2000; Syvertsen, 1992). Even
where broadcasting was not organized as a
public corporation, as in the Netherlands, there
was something comparable to a public service
remit, in its provision of an anchor for national
cultural identification. Although in the multi-
ethnic and multi-cultural European societies of
today the public service remit is defined with
less weight on the nation (Brants and de Bens,
2000), there are certain programme types that
explicitly emphasize the idea of national com-
munity and serve as venues for social cohesion.
Broadcasting the ceremonies and rituals of the
nation*/royal weddings and funerals, Indepen-
dence Day celebrations and the opening of
parliament*/has remained a priority and pre-
rogative of national broadcasters. It is not so
much their informative value that produces the
necessity for television to provide them, but the
fact that such events allow shared beliefs to be
invoked in order to bring people together (cf.
Carey, 1989), as well as to intensify emotional
identification with the polity (Berezin, 2002).
Benedict Anderson (1991) highlights the impor-
tance of mediated communication for national
identity: an ‘‘imaginary’’ community means that
national identities must be constructed and
reproduced through discursive practices instead
of actual experiences. It has been claimed that
television in particular has become essential in
creating post-modern social unity (van Zoonen,
2002). Besides the emphasis of difference with
others (nations), the construction of national
identity or consensus involves the evasion of
internal anxiety and controversy (Morley and
Robins, 1995).
Mourning Pim
Dayan and Katz (1993, p. 9) distinguish between
media events and news events. Great news
events, such as the murder of Fortuyn, ‘‘speak
of accidents, of disruption’’. But the pre-planned
live broadcast of Pim Fortuyn’s funeral service
and the funeral procession fits their definition of
a media event: a great ceremony ‘‘to celebrate
order and its restoration’’. We are interested in
the relationship between news events and
media events. It is not unusual that death
shatters social life, and creates a need to restore
it through rituals and other means. As Walter
(1999, p. xiii) notes in his book about mourning
Diana, death ‘‘provides a natural experiment in
how a society constructs order in the face of
disorder and anomie’’. Unexpected events can
be seen to offer this kind of ‘‘natural experi-
ment’’ for the news media too because they
reveal the ideological scripts, conventions and
practices of journalists at work. Often a dramatic
news event*/such as Anna Lindh’s murder in
Sweden or JFK’s in the United States*/can be
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turned almost naturally into an order-restoring
media event; this was much more problematic
with such an ambiguous figure as Pim Fortuyn,
even if the need to restore order was felt to be
urgent.
Interestingly, the editor of the public NOS
Journaal claims that journalists had only little
idea of what they were doing in the days
immediately following Fortuyn’s death. Instead
of asking the ‘‘Yes, but. . .’’-questions and pro-
viding context and explanation, they were
carried along by the event, unable to do more
than just register, and it took a week before they
had come to grips with the situation and felt
able to resume their normal journalistic func-
tions.4 What we are interested in here could be
summed up as, what are journalists doing when
they don’t know what they are doing?
‘‘That Such a Thing Could Happen in the
Netherlands’’
The murder of a politician, no matter how
controversial, in the midst of the national elec-
tion campaign, has particular symbolic implica-
tions, as well as political and social impacts.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the murders
of politicians in office such as Palme and
Kennedy have been portrayed as historical
turning points (e.g. Turnock, 2000, p. 33). This
narrative device, connecting all sort of tragic
events throughout the time, was widely used in
the Dutch news media. Journalists who look for
stories that symbolize change and turning
points marked the murder of Fortuyn as a
moment when the peaceful and tolerant Nether-
lands ‘‘lost its innocence’’. As Dayan and Katz
(1993) write, media events are also about record-
ing events in collective memory and revising
collective memory. Giving a historical frame, the
Palme and Kennedy murders were associated
with the Fortuyn murder, as were the public
reactions of the Dutch people with the reactions
of the mourners of Diana. Reminding the
audience about the fact that Fortuyn’s murder
was the first political assassination in the
Netherlands since the 17th century served to
highlight the significance of the event.
Stressing that the murder of Fortuyn was
completely alien to Dutch political culture,
Dutch political history and commonly held
Dutch democratic values, the media and autho-
rities also created a binding element in a
dramatic event. ‘‘What no one thought would
be possible in the Netherlands, did happen after
all’’, is the sentence with which the NOS
Journaal opened on 6 May, the night of the
murder. Comments like this presuppose a
shared terrain of Dutchness into which this
political murder does not fit. That message
was repeated over and over again, and it was
also expressed in many of the street interviews,
such as with a man in the NOS Journaal (10
May): ‘‘That such a thing could happen in the
Netherlands. I would never have expected
that.’’ Or with the crying elderly man, who
had just left the catholic cathedral in Rotterdam,
where thousands of people were queuing for
hours to pay their respects before Fortuyn’s
open white coffin: ‘‘It feels like losing a child.
That this is possible in the Netherlands. . .’’
The approach of the assassination as a turning
point includes an analysis of change from*/in
this case*/an idealized past to a troublesome
present and an uncertain future. In his intro-
ductory statement (NOS Journaal , 7 May), the
news presenter suggested that the assault on
Fortuyn was made possible by ‘‘a hardening
society’’. In the same news broadcast ordinary
people interviewed offer similar personal views
about what has happened in the Netherlands.
A middle-aged woman comments that ‘‘The
Netherlands have changed due to negative
influences’’ but she does not identify what those
influences are. Another interviewee, an elderly
woman accompanied by a younger woman,
connects the unwelcome change to free speech:
‘‘You just cannot say what you want to say
anymore . . . I used to be a ticket collector on the
buses and if I did not like how things were
going, I would say to someone who misbe-
haved: ‘Next stop you get off’.’’
‘‘I Feel Completely Devastated’’
In the days following the death of Pim Fortuyn
television news focused on people who were
visibly emotionally affected, people like the
weeping woman cited in the title in the NOS
Journaal of the day of the funeral (10 May).
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A wide range of expressions of emotions that
were displayed was readily accepted as part of a
normal or even expected mourning repertoire.
Next to the more conventional condolence
register, these included silent marches, candles,
flowers, dolls, letters, poems, and drawings.
At the memorial site in the Mediapark, where
he had been assassinated, people even laid
down his favourite cigars and attached
the striped neckties that he used to wear to
the gate. There is not too much difference
between the images on Dutch public and private
broadcast news. Ordinary people interviewed in
the streets or on other locations, women and
men alike, are often in complete shock, tears
running down their cheek, and comforting each
other.
As Hartley (1995; also Fiske, 1987) has noted,
in television news only ordinary people are
asked about their feelings. Ordinary people’s
stories serve the function of positioning the
viewer in a more direct relationship with the
events and those involved and thus add force to
the emotional intensity of the event (Langer,
1998, p. 87). Information that matters*/knowl-
edge, standpoints*/comes from experts and
institutional voices. Experts and politicians are
normally expected to be rational, but in the case
of dramatic events they are requested to show
emotion like everybody else, thus helping to
create an impression of a generally felt loss
and of shared grief. Other ways of differentiat-
ing between voices in televisual texts may be
reversed as well, and so for a few days the
normally subordinate views of ordinary people
who in terms of traditional news values
are generally excluded from news, may dom-
inate the news coverage of shocking events
like natural disasters, crime and accidents,
and may be treated as the official point of
view, or the nation’s point of view (see Couldry,
1999).
Despite the large amount of politicians in the
main news broadcasts on RTL4 and NOS, they
are easily outnumbered by ordinary people
being interviewed in the streets or at the official
or unofficial sites of mourning. We are not sure
if the range of voices commenting on the
situation was much wider than under normal
circumstances. It was certainly different. On one
hand, more extremist and racist and angrier
sounds were to be heard than under normal
conditions, though more in the live reports than
on the main news of NOS and RTL. However, it
was not these angry voices on which the news
focused. In most cases ordinary people were
asked how they felt, and most of them demon-
strated deep personal involvement with the
deceased or the events surrounding his death,
and cameras zoomed in on expressions of grief,
faces of women and men with tears running,
emotional texts, or a doll left behind at a gate.
These are a few examples:
Woman (RTL Nieuws , 7 May): ‘‘This man wanted to
help us. I have no word for this.’’
Woman (RTL Nieuws , 8 May): ‘‘Goodbye, dear Pim.
Thank you for everything. I am going to miss you.’’
Woman (NOS Journaal , 9 May): ‘‘This shouldn’t
have been. He was a man with a twinkle in his eye,
and it is no longer there.’’
Boy (NOS Journaal , 10 May): ‘‘I did not look at how
he looked. I looked deep into his eyes, and I saw
love, honesty and trustworthiness.’’
What is interesting is that despite the mani-
festly political nature of the murder these ‘‘vox
pops’’ were almost exclusively apolitical. Citi-
zens expressed an emotional response, or com-
plaints such as ‘‘we are going down, the whole
of Europe is going down’’ (woman in RTL
Nieuws , 7 May), but they did not, on the whole,
discuss the political element of the event, or its
potential political outcome. Neither did they
offer explicit political opinions on what should
be done to prevent the country going down.
When politics were mentioned, it was most
likely connected to Fortuyn’s personality or to
the feeling of grief. For instance, in public TV
news (NOS Journaal , 7 May) ‘‘hundreds of
people’’ were shown waiting in line to sign a
condolence register. Then came a close-up of
two teenage girls, one of whom was crying
silently, a tear running down her cheek. The
girl who wasn’t crying was interviewed: ‘‘He
was such a charismatic man who had a good
sense of humour and he spoke a language
which we could understand. Thanks to him,
young people got interested in politics again.
And now, well, . . . I don’t know. I really don’t
know.’’
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‘‘The Netherlands is in Mourning’’
Television went to great lengths to demonstrate
the universality of the shock and the unity of the
nation, which was not an easy task given the
controversial nature of Fortuyn and his political
ideas, and the heated discussions in and outside
the media of the previous months. The images
of mourning people in the news illustrate the
intensity of grief, in addition the mourning
of Fortuyn is given a nation-wide character
by such signs as the obituaries narrating For-
tuyn’s political career, attendance of the funeral
service by the cabinet, party leaders and other
members of parliament, live reports by the
national media, providing information to their
viewers on how to participate in mourning,
such as the locations and hours of registers
where people can offer their sympathy and
condolences.
RTL4 (‘‘The Netherlands is in Mourning ’’, 7
May) stressed the national character of mourn-
ing and the funeral somewhat more than NOS,
for instance by providing detailed information
about how viewers might attend the funeral
service, and about the time-schedule and route
of the funeral procession, but NOS also showed
a map with places where silent processions
would be held. In doing so they created the
conditions for new news events, consciously or
not. If the mourning was not described as
national, it was at least depicted as massive,
and having un-Dutch proportions and style.
As the presenter of RTL Nieuws stated in
her opening sentences of the news of 10
May: ‘‘The farewell to Pim Fortuyn has turned
into an event, such as the Netherlands has
never seen before. Many people crying, contin-
uous applause all along the route, spontaneous
singing, and people who try to touch the
hearse.’’
Authorities and media may have wanted to
downplay the controversial character of the
occasion, but the problem was not evaded
completely. The NOS Journaal presenter on 10
May said that Fortuyn’s funeral had ‘‘the scale
and the style’’ of a national funeral, but he
stopped short of calling it a national event.
Similarly, presenters and correspondents in
other news broadcasts often, though not always,
showed some hesitation or restraint in using
such a term to describe the situation, as the
following examples show:
Presenter (NOS Journaal , 7 May): ‘‘The Netherlands
seems to be immersed in collective mourning.’’
Presenter (NOS Journaal , 10 May): ‘‘When you see
all these thousands, can you say that there was
consensus in mourning?’’
Correspondent: ‘‘Yes you could say that . . . al-
though there are also people who have little under-
standing for this loud, collective mourning.’’
An RTL Nieuws reporter spoke on 10 May
of ‘‘Diana-like scenes’’ and another one on the
same day of ‘‘un-Netherlandish situations’’,
when people wanted to touch the hearse
carrying the corpse of Fortuyn. On the other
hand, presenters and reporters did not
show much surprise at other expressions
of mourning that had not been current
before in the Netherlands either, such as the
throwing of petals and flowers, a familiar
scene from Diana’s funeral, or lying in state
that is almost unprecedented in the Nether-
lands.
Reporters had more difficulty in interpreting
the more politically tainted expressions of emo-
tion or of political protest, such as the chanting
and whistling by supporters of Feyenoord foot-
ball club of Rotterdam, the angry slogans
against the government shouted by right-wing
activists, or the posters demanding the death of
the prime minister. They were not disregarded
but interestingly they seem to have been ac-
cepted as belonging to a wide diversity of
sometimes strange but nevertheless legitimate
expressions of grief, now that mourning had
been defined as nationwide. For instance, an
NOS Journaal item (9 May) about people paying
homage to Fortuyn included footage of people
shouting ‘‘Pim Fortuyn’’, clapping their hands
or lifting their fists. The camera zoomed in on a
young man who shouted that the Purple cabinet
must be punished and that everybody should
vote for Fortuyn. The reporter commented on
this footage by saying that the ‘‘collective grief’’
seems to lead to some rather frightening
reactions.
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That the news media was engaged in nego-
tiating between appropriate grieving and mass
hysteria, which is typically feared by political
and cultural elite, was made rather explicitly in
RTL News (10 May), where the reporter on
location was specifically asked to give his
personal assessment about special forms of
mourning:
Presenter: ‘‘Are you impressed?’’ [about the loud
slogans and chanting from the crowds]
Correspondent: ‘‘Yes Jeroen, I guess I am. Some
people found that improper . . . but not many. And I
did not really find it improper either.’’
On the night of 8 May, when Feyenoord
football club had to play their UEFA Cup final,
the NOS correspondent in Rotterdam also
made an effort to reconcile the exuberance of
football supporters in front of the Rotterdam
town hall, with the grief of other people who
where laying down flowers for Fortuyn there.
Although he acknowledged a ‘‘symbolic di-
vide’’, he added, referring to the dancing and
singing supporters: ‘‘But don’t forget that these
are actually the same people who have paid
their respects earlier today’’ (NOS Journaal , 8
May). A Feyenoord fan further confirmed the
connection between football partying and
mourning for Pim: ‘‘I hope Feyenoord wins
this game for Pim Fortuyn.’’ Also the RTL
correspondent reported that they were actually
singing about Pim Fortuyn (RTL Nieuws , 8
May).
How television news gave precedence to
community over disunity can also be illustrated
by a sequence of shots in the NOS Journaal of 7
May. First we see images of people bringing
flowers to the square in front of the Houses of
Parliament in The Hague, while in the back-
ground burnt-out car wrecks are being towed
away by cranes, and a voice-over explains that
these are the remains of riots of the night before.
Then the camera turns again to the images of
flowers, candles, poems being laid down and
finally to images of Prime Minister Wim Kok,
who is making a statement in the House: ‘‘The
Dutch can take a lot, and this is a good sig-
nal to everybody that our democracy is still
functioning. . .’’
‘‘Is Anything Known About . . . Skin Colour?’’
The main concern of Dutch television journalists
seems to have been that the disunity in the
nation would take an ethnic turn. Public televi-
sion news in particular, but commercial broad-
casting as well, made an effort to try to take
away any impression that Fortuyn’s death
might have anything to do with the ethnic
factor, obviously considered to be the most
disruptive and harmful to national unity. ‘‘Did
anyone get a glimpse of the perpetrator? Is
anything known about*/[pause]*/say, skin
colour?’’, was one of the first questions asked
by the NOS news presenter on the night of
Fortuyn’s murder. A little later the NOS Journaal
hastened to announce, with obvious relief, that
the arrested suspect was a white male . Until that
time the mentioning of ethnic background had
been considered highly irregular.5 Laroes of
NOS News described the situation on the night
of the murder as follows:
I remember that we, at that moment at 8 o’clock, as
editor of the day, did something that we had not
done before: told the presenter that he should say
that the man who had then been apprehended, that
it concerned a white Dutch male. I found it
important to say that, because what everyone first
expected no doubt was that the man concerned
would be an immigrant. If it had been an immi-
grant the situation would have been even more
chaotic and aggressive, I think.6
It is noteworthy that the news about the
suspect’s skin colour and nationality came as a
relief. Noteworthy, because it shows what kind
of murderer the journalists themselves had
expected. And also because a coloured, especially
a Muslim, suspect was supposed to have been
problematic. Even after the identity of the suspect
had been disclosed, the news continued to
operate from this perspective, working to contain
the potential for ethnic or religious conflict.7
Fortuyn had a mixed following and his
electoral list contained several representatives
of ethnic minorities, but because of his out-
spoken anti-immigration, anti-Muslim, and anti-
multicultural society political programme his
enemies were automatically expected from that
side. It is therefore interesting to see that Dutch
television news, both public and commercial,
often zoomed in on people of colour in the street
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processions, funeral crowds, and gave more
than ample room in lay interviews and ‘‘expert’’
interviews to representatives of ethnic minori-
ties: NOS Journaal (10 May), for instance, inter-
viewed Imam Abdullah Haselhoef on the day of
the funeral. The number of representatives of
ethnic minorities is larger than could have been
expected if one compares it with the composi-
tion of the mourning or protesting crowds that
could be seen on television during those days.
Furthermore, a substantial number of people,
who could be held to represent the voice of
ethnic minorities in Dutch society, or who were
put by television in that role, testified how much
they regretted the political murder and the
death of Fortuyn. Two examples:
Mohamed Sini of the Islam and Citizenship Society
(NOS Journaal , 7 May): ‘‘This is a tremendous shock
for the whole of Dutch society, and also for us as
Muslims.’’
Ahmed Aboutaleb, head of Forum, an organization
representing ethnic minority interests (NOS Jour-
naal , 7 May): ‘‘The Netherlands has 16 million
inhabitants. The 16 million are shocked. The 16
million are a nation. You cannot take 1.7 million
out.’’
On the same day, a voice-over at RTL Nieuws
(7 May), accompanying pictures of people sign-
ing the register at Fortuyn’s house, declared that
migrant organizations such as Turkish Milli
Go¨ru¨s would pay their respects later that day.
The numerous street interviews contained no
real critical remarks about Fortuyn and his
policies or anything else that might disturb the
consensus in mourning. In the 8 o’clock NOS
Journaal of 10 May, the day of his funeral, the
only interviewees expressing serious doubts
were both white and interviewed at some
distance from the crowds.
‘‘Which Role the Media Might Have Played?’’
In the aftermath of his death Fortuyn’s party
lawyers accused the Dutch government of hav-
ing failed to protect Fortuyn adequately, and
filed charges against several Dutch politicians,
journalists, media columnists and media, for
having contributed to a climate in which he
could have been murdered. Fortuyn himself, in
a talk show interview shortly before his death,
repeated on the news after his death (RTL4
Nieuws Extra , 6 May), had claimed that the
government that had ‘‘demonized’’ him, would
have to be held responsible, if something ever
happened to him. The public outcry at his death
and the results of the general elections suggest
that many may have shared this view.
One important reason for the large number of
ordinary people as ‘‘lay experts’’ may be that
first Fortuyn’s electoral success and now his
death seemed to have proved that the media
had failed to register the massive discontent
below the quiet waters of Dutch multicultural
society. During the first days after his death
reporters met with clear animosity from the
crowds. Although RTL had had a less trouble-
some relationship with Fortuyn than the public
broadcaster, the public seemed to blame the
media in general for having maltreated Fortuyn,
echoing Fortuyn’s and his group’s view during
the election campaign. Especially public televi-
sion news tried to convey the message that it
had dealt fairly with all political parties, includ-
ing Fortuyn’s.
On the evening of his murder the NOS news
presenter without any immediate reason asked
the programme’s political correspondent about
the media’s potential role in the murder: ‘‘Do we
know which role the media might have
played?’’ The Hague correspondent answered
that he did not know, but ‘‘wouldn’t say there is
a connection’’. The next day (NOS Journaal , 7
May) the conversation turned to the neutrality
of public television news itself. The correspon-
dent, Job Frieszo, had been accused of tenden-
tious reporting, when he had held up in front of
the camera the party programme of an extreme-
right party while talking about Pim Fortuyn’s
standpoints:8
Presenter (NOS Journaal , 7 May): ‘‘Herben [spokes-
man of Fortuyn’s party] has criticized the media.’’
Correspondent: ‘‘Fortuyn attacked the estab-
lishment, including the established med-
ia . . . Fortuyn was quite different from other
politicians and therefore automatically news-
worthy. Now and then he may have been put
down as an extremist, but the media have
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dealt with him mostly in a business-like sort
of way.’’
Discussion
It has been noted by several authors that the
pressures to claim that society comes together
are intensifying as the material basis of shared
experience is becoming more precarious (e.g.
Bauman, 2001a, 2001b). Media events are
usually seen as occasions of affirmation of the
national community, which might otherwise
only have an ambiguous social existence. How-
ever, like Couldry (2003), we see media events
as much as constructions as expressions of
togetherness. For a dramatic news event to
become a national and media event with a
potential for feeling community, more is needed
than a nationwide live televised occasion break-
ing through normal broadcast schedules. On the
other hand, even unlikely candidates for the
position of a media event can be made to look as
such by de-emphasizing their disruptive poten-
tial, by broadening the definition of legitimate
ritual, by de-politicizing signs of opposition, by
focusing on emotion, and giving preferential
treatment to the voices of unity. As we have
shown, the news forged a sense of emotional
unity by the representation of mourning and
rearticulated political outrage as personal anxi-
ety by focusing on questions like how people
felt about the murder. The reason may be
political, an urgent need to try to re-establish a
sense of togetherness, where none is available.
The need to define Fortuyn’s death as a
national event seems to have been shared by
the media, mourning citizens and the govern-
ment, but for different reasons. Television’s
efforts to construct or reconstruct national con-
sensus seem to have been led by its interpreta-
tion of the issue at stake in terms of the
cherished Dutch values of the multicultural
society. Although media are at the centre of
the construction of a national event and Dutch
television news played an active part in framing
the murder of Fortuyn in this particular way,
their role may still have been more its conductor
than its author. Larger segments of the general
public, as well as the government, may exercise
pressure for a controversial event to be handled
in a particular manner, and this concerns also its
coverage by the media (cf. Dayan, 2001). To see
his death and funeral accepted as a national
tragedy gave some satisfaction to the dissatis-
fied in Dutch society.
The construction of a feeling community
through the rhetoric of unity and representa-
tions of mourning was, however, a difficult task
for the Dutch media. Media events may provide
opportunities for underlying conflicts to be
expressed and negotiated as they are ‘‘points
of maximum turbulence’’ and ‘‘sites of popular
engagement and involvement’’ (Fiske, 1994).
This opportunity was not taken up by the
media, at least not at that time. The political
protest at Fortuyn’s death was rendered harm-
less by re-defining it as belonging to a range of
reasonable expressions of national mourning.
Many acts, which could have been understood
as acts of protest and anger, such as the
applause, the letters that were attached to the
gate of Mediapark, were presented as expres-
sions of grief. The fact that the news of his death
may actually have been greeted with a sense of
relief or indifference in some circles remained
unacknowledged, perhaps not because the
media neglected these feelings on purpose, but
because they were not expressed openly.
We also argue that the question was not of the
defence of social values alone but of the media’s
authority and social status. Eventually the death
of Fortuyn led Dutch public TV news to
critically reappraise its policies and procedures.
The unexpected anger and discontent mobilized
by Fortuyn seemed to confirm that the media in
general, and public television in particular, had
lost touch with large strata of Dutch society.
Public television news set out to deal with the
more problematic sides of multi-ethnic Dutch
society as well with a new motto Staat en Straat ,
State and Street. News was to become more
representative, more relevant and more acces-
sible (NOS Journaal, 2002 ).
Given the controversy surrounding Fortuyn,
his death and funeral cannot be termed a
national event in the same way as those of
Anna Lindh, Olof Palme or even Princess Diana.
Nevertheless, his death and funeral came to be
raised to the status of national events by
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extensive live coverage both on public and
private television. Mourning his death was
sanctioned as national mourning if only by the
presence of government ministers and members
of parliament at his funeral service (even if they
entered by the backdoor). The political murder
itself had a traumatic impact and came as a
shock, but Fortuyn alive had been a shock to
dominant political values in Dutch society, as
well. Much like Princess Diana had functioned
vis-a`-vis the royal establishment of the Windsors
in Britain (e.g. McGuigan, 2000), he had repre-
sented the protest of disgruntled people against
established politics in the Netherlands. His
death also had a disruptive and divisive poten-
tial. The construction of Fortuyn’s death and
funeral as national events bears the marks of the
unacknowledged rift between the discontent
below the surface of Dutch society and the official
ideology of the free, open and tolerant multi-
cultural society. Defining the tragedy as national
can be perceived as a way of reducing tension and
forging a sense of emotional unity; that is,
constructing a nationwide feeling community.
Notes
1 Theo van Gogh was shot and stabbed to death in broad daylight on 2 November 2004. The death of this outspoken filmmaker
seems to be directly connected to a short film Submission he produced together with Member of Parliament Ayaan Hirsi Ali,
in which the treatment of women in Islam and in the Koran was severely criticized. The noisy memorial service was
announced by Amsterdam Mayor Job Cohen a few hours after the murder, when it became clear that the murder was
connected to Van Gogh’s controversial opinions (see ‘‘Thousands Make a Racket at Van Gogh Rally’’, Expatica , 3 November
2004).
2 SBS has been more successful with its late evening Hart van Nederland , a news programme focusing on regional news and
human interest.
3 Interview with Hans Laroes, 25 June 2004.
4 Interview with Hans Laroes, 25 June 2004.
5 Interview with Hans Laroes, 25 June 2004. A similar attitude was displayed early on the day of the assassination of
newspaper columnist and filmmaker Theo van Gogh. During extra television news broadcasts his suspected murderer was
described as dressed as someone with an Islamic background or someone who wanted to appear as such .
6 Interview with Hans Laroes, 25 June 2004.
7 The TV news did pay attention to the suspected murderer’s background and his previous activities in environment protection
and animal rights groups, but that matter was not treated as potentially disruptive.
8 Nico Haasbroek, the executive producer of the NOS Journaal , who had openly criticized his correspondent in another TV
programme, resigned or was forced to resign.
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